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radioactivity |ˌrādēōakˈtivətē|
noun
the emission of ionizing radiation or particles caused by the 
spontaneous disintegration of atomic nuclei.
‘Bedtime Stories’
O
. B
lo
em
en
The Unfamiliar 09http://journals.ed.ac.uk/unfamiliar/ ISSN: 2050-778X
Consisting of moving subatomic particles, radioactiv-ity is invisible, has no smell and makes no sound. 
Its presence can only be detected with Geiger counters 
and other measuring instruments. Its transformations 
and symptoms are more real to us: the iconic mushroom 
cloud of a nuclear bomb, barrels of nuclear waste, cancer 
increases in exposed populations, or contaminated waste-
lands. Recognition of radioactive risk, or its denial, de-
pends on those who employ the measuring instruments, 
assess cancer or toxicity rates, or set safety standards. 
In a society greatly relying on empirical evidence and 
technical expertise, it is scientists who have first access 
to knowledge about radioactivity.
NATURE’S REPRESENTATIVES
With the birth of modern empirical science, scientists 
have come to be seen as representatives of an entity 
called ‘nature’ (see Latour 2004). The perceived sepa-
ration between nature and culture fuelled expectations 
of ‘nature’ as tractable and promised human flourishing 
through scientific and technological progress. These be-
liefs were challenged with the rise of environmentalism 
and public awareness of risks, before but significantly 
since the 1960s. However, as environmentalism became 
more integrated in ‘mainstream’ political institutions, 
science and technology were again elevated as the so-
lution to ‘environmental issues’ rather than part of the 
problem (see Grove-White 1993, Yearly 1993). In the 
development and implementation of recent environmen-
tal policies and regulations, scientific experts are front 
and centre.  
Two quotes taken from web-articles on the nuclear disas-
ter in Fukushima in March 2011 exemplify this:
But just how much [nuclear] fallout does the 
government need to remove in order to protect 
human health? On that key question the science 
is frustratingly inconclusive. [Bird 2012, my 
emphasis]
‘What impact this radioactive contamination 
has on marine life and humans is still unclear… 
this is not a fully developed science and there 
are lots of uncertainties.’ [Grozman 2011, my 
emphasis]
Implicit here is the expectation that science, if ‘fully de-
veloped’, should be able to provide conclusive evidence 
on matters like the impact of radioactivity. As will be-
come clear, scientists walk a tight rope: they need to bal-
ance the high uncertainties in their knowledge with the 
high demands for facts from policy-makers, industry and 
members of the public. At the same time, the (empirical) 
is question is tied up with the (normative) ought ques-
tion: what impacts of nuclear technologies are accept-
able, or in other words, to what extent should human and 
environmental health be compromised under the banner 
of technological and social progress?
In September 2012, I conducted fieldwork at the ‘Inter-
national Symposium on Environmental Radioactivity: 
Implications for Environmental & Human Health’ in 
Plymouth, England. Speaking to radio-epidemiologists, 
radio-biologists, radio-ecologists, radio-chemists, radio-
physicists, geo-chemists and geologists, as well as to pol-
icymakers and members of industry, I tried to gain access 
to otherwise secluded knowledge about environmental 
radioactivity.
ORDINARINESS
The church-turned-conference venue at the edge of Plym-
outh’s University campus was characterised by swift-
gliding doors and a lack of natural light. The programme 
of the conference was packed with presentations, mostly 
concerning pieces of research, case studies and protection 
frameworks. The socio-political dimensions of environ-
mental radioactivity were packed into six presentations 
in the last session, with the mouthful title of ‘Regulation, 
Policy and Risk Assessment; Research Need; Socio-Eco-
nomic Impact; Public Perception’. 
In the mornings and soon after lunch, only the front 
benches of the lecture theatre were filled. Many of the se-
nior researchers seemed to know each other (‘It’s a small 
field’, I was told) and used the gathering mainly for meet-
ings and catch-ups. PhD students admitted to be hunting 
jobs, while delegates from industry and policy stayed on 
the fringes. Differences were smoothed out, however, on 
the evening of the first day, when I accompanied the dele-
gates to a fancy fish dinner in the National Marine Aquar-
ium. Rays and small sharks witnessed us from behind the 
glass wall while wine was being generously poured.   
For most of it, the symposium stood out in its appearance 
of ordinariness. A visit of a local journalist to the wel-
come reception was the only indication that the confer-
ence topic was of any public importance. But the devil, as 
always, was in the detail – or, perhaps, in the discourse. 
DEFINITIONAL STRUGGLES
Taking a Foucauldian discursive approach, scientific dis-
courses can be seen as ‘normalising discourses’ whose 
power lies both in their ability to define experience in a 
particular way and to efface this particularity and their 
underpinning power relations by framing these as natural. 
Scientific definitions of, for example, risk, pollution and 
harm partly determine how people perceive and interact 
with the environment. 
In the field of environmental radioactivity, however, sci-
entists are constantly challenged in their role as autho-
rised representatives of radiation risk. Rather than simply 
imposed on a supposedly pliable public, its discourse 
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seems to emerge from constant ‘definitional struggles’ 
between stakeholders over the very nature of these risks 
(Beck 1992). Kath Weston (2011) describes how in the 
after-math of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, radiation 
risks did not only become the subject of definitional 
struggles over the interpretation of knowledge, but also of 
what she calls ‘techno-struggles’ over the production of 
knowledge, as worried Japanese citizens began to ques-
tion information released by the government and built 
Geiger counters to measure radiation themselves.
At the Symposium, scientists would define radioactivity 
to me mostly in direct response to what they considered 
public fears of radioactivity: 
People think immediately about fish with three 
eyes!
Even the word ‘radioactivity’ scares people. 
If you say you can measure radioactivity, they 
think it’s contaminated… 
They would then go on to downplay radiation risks by 
comparing human-induced radiation to natural back-
ground radiation or to other allegedly bigger risks. 
POLLUTION BELIEFS
While radiation might be real in the sense of material, 
its reality status (Adam, 1996) - as dangerous, desirable, 
risky, polluting or natural - arises in a process of com-
petition, conflict and negotiation among different actors: 
scientists, publics, politicians and members of industry. 
Here we can draw insights from Mary Douglas’ famous 
framing of dirt as ‘matter out of place’ (1966, 2002): Pol-
lution beliefs, she argued, are physical boundaries drawn 
to distinguish between the moral and immoral and, as 
such, reflect a particular social order (Idem: 36). In later 
work, however, she refused to extend this argument to 
scientific claims (1982, 1999). Still, as I will show, when 
and for whom radioactive matter comes to be considered 
‘out of place’ reflects value orientations rather than facts. 
For opponents of nuclear technologies human-induced 
radiation has come to embody in its invisibility both pol-
lution and danger. It is matter out of place, or even more 
so, matter that should not have been created and released 
by humans in the first place. For them, it has taken on 
strong moral significance too: Nuclear risk, symbolic of 
the problems of contemporary society, emerged as the 
flagship of the environmental movement in the 1970s 
(Strydom 2002: 22).
However, during the Symposium, when delegates dis-
cussed human-induced radiation, terms like pollution or 
contamination were used only to denote extreme, ‘high-
exposure’ scenarios. They casually spoke of radionuclide 
behaviour in terrestrial ecosystems, radioactive discharg-
es or routine emissions. They discussed the effects and 
impacts of radionuclides on people and the environment 
rather than their harm. In other words, it became clear that 
when human-induced radiation is measured by scientists 
in the environment, it is not necessarily classified by them 
as pollution or contamination. Where are these boundar-
ies drawn? Douglas and Wildawsky describe what they 
call ‘technical’ or ‘objective’ pollution as ‘some harmful 
interference with natural processes’ (1982: 36). In inter-
national environmental legislation, pollution is also com-
monly defined with reference to ‘harm’ (Warren 1993). 
Scientific definitions of radioactive pollution thus partly 
depend on shifting, subjective categories of ‘the natural’ 
or pre-polluted, as well as of ‘harm’. 
MUTANT ECOLOGIES
Everyone, everywhere, is exposed to ‘background radia-
tion’. Although the exposure differs per geographical lo-
cation, we get irradiated from naturally occurring radio-
nuclides in the soil, in our diets, in the air; we are exposed 
to cosmic rays and to radiation emitted by certain types 
of rocks. But background radiation is not only ‘natu-
ral’: In the UK about 15% of the background radiation 
comes from cumulative effects of industry: in the major-
ity from medical applications of radioactivity, followed 
by the residues of nuclear disasters and nuclear weapon 
tests, and operating nuclear power plants. This low-level 
‘background exposure’ to radiation, partly caused by hu-
mans and continuing to rise, is possibly already changing 
the genetic structure of plants, animals, and people. Cur-
rent work on the consequences of the Fukushima disaster 
found mutations among birds and butterflies, at levels of 
exposure ‘way below anything we’d expect from the lit-
erature’, one informant tells me: ‘If they are correct, that 
might change all the protection criteria’. 
Mutations can lead to irreversible evolutionary change, 
cancer, deformities and so-called ‘genetic noise’ that 
neither improves nor injures the organism but does af-
fect future generations (Masco 2006: 301). It is ‘a spe-
cific kind of break that reinvents the future’ (Idem). Mu-
tagenic processes blur familiar analytical dichotomies 
such as nature-culture, subject-object, human-animal and 
natural-artificial. What does this mean for ‘environmen-
tal protection’? What counts as ‘harm’ when we speak 
about mutations, and what is acceptable? Perhaps what is 
at stake here is no longer the protection of nature but ‘the 
choice of what sort of nature and society we want’ (Hajer 
1996: 259). 
UNKNOWABLE FUTURES
To develop environmental regulations and safety stan-
dards, scientists are required to predict future ‘harm’ 
caused by human activities. This is problematic not 
only because what constitutes ‘harm’ is open to debate, 
but also because scientific innovation by definition cre-
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ates ‘unknowable futures’, as time theorist Adam writes 
(1996: 95-6). While mechanistic knowledge is required 
to devise new technologies, the knowledge required to 
study and predict their real-world impacts is of a differ-
ent kind: both natural and social processes are networked, 
non-linear and as such inherently unpredictable (Adam 
1993). The result is that ‘our predictive knowledge falls 
behind the technical knowledge which nourishes our 
power to act’, as philosopher Hans Jonas asserts (1974: 
10). This turns our world into a living laboratory in which 
new technologies come into use and new industries roll 
out with little pause, unanticipated consequences bounc-
ing back at us further down the line. 
Paradoxically, while knowledge about the future is more 
and more reduced to the present, the effects of activi-
ties extend more and more into the future. For example, 
a radionuclide never ceases to be radioactive, however 
slightly. Since we cannot usefully talk about the ‘life’ of 
a radioactive source, the concept of ‘half-life’ is used: 
the time it takes for its level of radioactivity to fall by 
half. For example, an average nuclear power reactor re-
leases varying amounts of tritium, radiocarbon (C-14) 
and Plutonium-239 into the environment, with half-lives 
of 12 years, 5,700 years and 24,400 years respectively. 
Equally, spent nuclear fuel can remain radioactive for at 
least 10,000 years, or even 250,000-500,000 years if the 
fuel contains plutonium (Fairlie 2011). At the sympo-
sium, one presenter discussed the environmental risk as-
sessments undertaken for a permanent burial facility for 
nuclear waste in Finland. There it was decided to work 
with a time-scale of 10,000 years, as beyond that, it was 
‘just guessing’. 
Scientists are asked to represent a future they cannot ac-
cess empirically. On the basis of experiments and envi-
ronmental monitoring of irradiated areas, they try to pre-
dict future effects through models, which enable them to 
coin certain safety thresholds for the release of radionu-
clides in a particular locality. A French marine biologist 
explained to me that, in the laboratory, his team conducts 
experiments ‘in which we have only one parameter that 
is changing, which is the stressor, the polluter.’ Ethnog-
raphies of laboratory practices confirm that scientists 
tend to study controlled, cleaned and purified phenom-
ena about which models can be more easily made (Latour 
& Woolgar 1979, Knorr-Cetina 1983). As such, experi-
ments cannot account for all the interactions and different 
stressors in the environment, including, for example, the 
synergistic effects of radionuclides with other (chemical) 
particles. 
Mutagenic effects also escape from the scientific gaze, 
due to empirical science’s limited material, spatial and 
temporal focus: in lab experiments and ecological field-
work, predictions of the future are generally formed 
through an analysis of causes and effects, on the basis 
of what observably happened in the past. Mutagenic ef-
fects, however, often only manifest themselves in our 
bodies and in eco-systems long after the harm has been 
done. Here links between causes and effects are hardly 
detectable. Occurring far away from the source in time 
and space, field sampling cannot fully capture radiation 
effects either. As such, embodied in latent processes, fu-
ture effects are denied reality status by empirical science 
(Adam & Groves 2002). They are real but not tangible; 
they are underway but not yet materialized into empiri-
cally accessible phenomena (Idem). 
UNCERTAINTY & HUMILITY
My informants often refused to give their personal opin-
ion on the unpredictable, long-term effects of radiation 
induced by nuclear technologies: 
As a scientist, I cannot say that the impact of 
radioactivity which is added to the natural radia-
tion in the natural environment is actually kill-
ing species. I can’t say that because we can’t see 
that!’ [My emphasis]
The nature of radioactive ecologies seems to challenge 
the expectations of science held by the public and policy-
makers alike. Nature-culture configurations characterised 
by mutations defy any take on nature as knowable and 
manageable – if indeed it ever was. Mutant ecologies are 
unpredictable and uncontrollable. As such mainstream 
environmentalism’s focus on physical and demonstrable 
‘limits’ of the environment, trespassed by humans, hits 
the wall of scientific uncertainty. 
Jasanoff observes that in fact most questions regulators 
ask of scientists cannot adequately be answered by sci-
ence (1990: 7). The scientists I interviewed indeed admit-
ted that the environmental assessments they undertook 
and the numerical criteria they provided to policymak-
ers were clouded in uncertainty. At the same time, they 
stressed they had to answer to demands for facts by regu-
lators and other authorities. One informant working for 
the International Commission for Radiological Protec-
tion told me they will eventually start adding uncertainty 
ranges to the numerical protection criteria they develop. 
He added:
But the difficulty is: how do you interpret that 
information? [Grinning] We always laugh. We 
say that regulators - bearing in mind I used to be 
one - wear their simple hats: ‘Yes! No answers!’ 
Providing numbers is a much clearer way to be 
able to explain to people this is safe and this 
isn’t safe.
Science fixes our attention on the knowable. The combi-
nation of scientific uncertainty and demands for facts can 
allow for inaction on potentially destructive ‘externali-
ties’ of human activities: A lack of conclusive evidence 
on any long-term consequences is all too readily taken 
as a legitimation for business as usual. Jasanoff argues 
that what our age needs is humility: humility ‘about both 
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‘Menace on the Horizon’
All images courtesy of Darren Nisbett and used with his kind permission.
For more images and information visit http://www.darkoptics.net/
These photos are from the UK photographer’s series ‘Chernobyl: Alienation’. Nisbett visited in 2011, 25 years after 
the Chernobyl nuclear accident, the 2,600 km2 abandoned Chernobyl Exclusion Zone in the Ukraine. Pripyat, now a 
ghost town, was built in 1970 as a home to the thousands of people that worked at and around the power plant. The 
day after the explosion, the inhabitants were given two hours to pack their belongings and were told that they would 
be away for a matter of days. But they would never return to their homes.
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the limits of scientific knowledge and about when to stop 
turning to science to solve problems’ (2007: 33). Practic-
ing humility would lead ‘policy-makers to re-engage with 
the moral foundations for acting in the face of inevitable 
scientific uncertainty’ (Idem).
My informants did not see scientific uncertainties about 
impacts as a barrier to the use of nuclear technologies. 
One informant who worked and researched in environ-
mental management in the UK, told me:
We’re left in a situation where we have to make 
decisions now because things are being devel-
oped now, things are happening now (…) Un-
certainty can’t stop you from taking decisions, 
because otherwise, development would stagnate 
completely. (His emphasis)
Most of my informants were outspokenly in favour of 
nuclear energy and technologies. They often held a utili-
tarian stance: nuclear technologies were simply a case in 
which the benefits outweighed the risks, and over-caution 
should not hinder ‘development’. 
CONCLUSION
If science cannot reliably predict the long-term effects of 
the build-up of human-induced radioactive particles in 
the environment, questions arise: What level of harm and 
risk to both human and environmental health is accept-
able? What kind of environment and what kind of future 
do we want, or ought, to create? 
Perhaps what is needed first is recognition that the process 
of establishing safe and acceptable levels of radiation is 
indeed a subjective one. Scientists cannot adequately pre-
dict the long-term impacts of nuclear technologies, and 
questions of what we ought to be protecting bring us from 
the empirical into the normative realm. Representing ra-
diation risk is, as any act of representation, a political act. 
Once we recognise that, we can address decisions about 
the use of nuclear technologies more openly and more 
humbly. It is time to ask: who should be representing ra-
diation risk, the environment and the future? This is thus 
not only a question of access to knowledge, but also of 
the allocation of agency and authority in decision-making 
processes. uf
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